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Corporate Structure and the Informativeness of Provision
Management: Evidence from the Netherlands
Abstract
This study considers the inﬂuence of Dutch governance structures on the infor-
mativeness of reported unexpected changes in provisions. Characteristics of the
corporate governance system in the Netherlands provide a unique opportunity to
investigate the inﬂuence of characteristics of the governance system on market
reactions to ﬁnancial disclosures. This governance system allows a distinction be-
tween structure companies, where supervisors’ disciplinary power is high, and non-
structure companies, where supervisors’ disciplinary power is low. Characteristics
of the Dutch ﬁnancial accounting system are comparable to those of Anglo-Saxon
systems. I investigate investors’ response to the disclosure of unexpected changes
in provisions by means of an event study which focuses on the abnormal stock
returns during two days surrounding the disclosure date. Additionally, I examine
analysts’ forecast revisions around the disclosure date by using I/B/E/S earnings
forecasts. The empirical evidence indicates that unexpected provisions are pos-
itively associated with abnormal stock returns and abnormal forecast revisions,
suggesting that non-structure companies use unexpected changes in provisions to
signal future performance. The positive relationship between unexpected changes
in provisions and the market reaction is more pronounced when my proxy for
information asymmetry is high. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that unexpected changes
in provisions of structure companies are signiﬁcantly less informative. I argue
that this is attributable to the fact that supervisors of structure companies exer-
cise more discipline over company management than supervisors of non-structure
companies.
Key words: Provisions, earnings management, corporate governance.
1 Introduction
Previous research suggests that governance structure and board eﬀectiveness are important
determinants of management’s use of discretion in ﬁnancial reporting. Concentrated stock
ownership, managerial stock ownership and board eﬀectiveness play an important role in
restraining earnings management (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; Peasnell et al. 1998;
Warﬁeld et al. 1995). Recent discussions on the eﬀectiveness of the Anglo-Saxon corporate
governance systems and the growing awareness that alternative governance systems, such
as those in Germany and Japan, provide eﬀective control mechanisms (see, for example,
Roe 1994; Shleifer and Vishny 1997), indicate that attention for the inﬂuence of non-Anglo-
Saxon governance systems on management’s discretion in ﬁnancial reporting is warranted.
This study considers the inﬂuence of Dutch governance structures on the informativeness
of reported unexpected changes in provisions. Using provision data of Dutch listed compa-
nies, I assess whether investors’ and ﬁnancial analysts’ reactions to companies’ disclosure of
unexpected changes in provisions depend on characteristics of these companies’ Supervisory
Boards. Unique properties of the corporate governance system in the Netherlands provide
the opportunity to investigate the eﬀect of diﬀerences in supervisors’ disciplinary power over
company management on the market’s interpretation of ﬁnancial disclosures. The main char-
acteristics of the Dutch ﬁnancial accounting system are comparable to those of Anglo-Saxon
accounting systems. For instance, the alignment of Dutch tax accounting and ﬁnancial ac-
counting is low; the Netherlands have a private accounting standard setting body; Dutch
spending on audit services is high; and, the Dutch common stock and bond markets are
well-developed (see Mueller et al. 1994).1 Furthermore, prior research indicates that Dutch
ﬁnancial reporting is relatively informative (Alford et al. 1993).
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Based on the legal regimes provided by Dutch regulation governing the corporate structure
of public companies I make a distinction between structure companies and non-structure
companies. Structure companies diﬀer from non-structure companies in that only supervisors
of structure companies have the authority to appoint and dismiss management, amend the
annual statements and veto strategic decisions. In this paper I argue that this causes the
disciplinary power of structure companies’ supervisors to be greater than the disciplinary
power of non-structure companies’ supervisors, aﬀecting management’s accounting decisions.
The sample used in this study consists of provision data available from the annual reports
of 90 ﬁrms that have been listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange from 1989 to 1997. The
examined provisions include provisions that are highly discretionary, such as provisions for
maintenance costs and provisions for underinsured property. I investigate investors’ response
to the disclosure of unexpected changes in provisions by means of an event study which focuses
on the abnormal stock returns surrounding the disclosure date. Additionally, I examine
analysts’ forecast revisions around the disclosure date by using I/B/E/S earnings forecasts.
The empirical evidence is consistent with the idea that unexpected changes in provisions
of non-structure companies convey management’s private information about expected future
proﬁtability. Unexpected changes in provisions of these companies are positively associated
with abnormal stock returns and abnormal forecast revisions, indicating that provisions are
informative. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that unexpected changes in provisions of structure companies
are signiﬁcantly less informative. I argue that this is attributable to the fact that supervisors
of structure companies exercise more discipline over company management than supervisors
of non-structure companies due to diﬀerences in their formal authorities, thereby restraining
management’s discretion in reporting provisions.
This study contributes to the earnings management literature in several respects. First, it
2
examines informative earnings management in a country where ﬁnancial reporting is ﬂexible
but where reported earnings are found to be relatively informative and forecast accuracy is
found to be relatively high (Alford et al. 1993; Capstaﬀ et al. 1996; Basu et al. 1998). Second,
the empirical analysis avoids the problems associated with discretionary accrual estimation
by focusing on largely discretionary provisions. Third, the study adds to previous research
on the inﬂuence of governance structures on earnings management. Governance structures in
the Netherlands provide a unique opportunity to investigate the inﬂuence of characteristics
of the corporate system on market reactions to ﬁnancial disclosures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops hypotheses
and discusses the research design. Section 3 addresses the sample selection procedures and
variable deﬁnitions. Section 4 describes the empirical results. Concluding comments appear
in section 5.
2 Hypotheses development and research design
(i) Provision management
A substantial amount of literature discusses managers’ discretion regarding reported earn-
ings. Many previous studies focus on single-year earnings management when managers use
discretion in ﬁnancial reporting to inﬂuence stakeholders’ perception of the company’s current
ﬁnancial performance. For instance, Healy (1985) and Holthausen et al. (1995) investigate
whether managers manipulate accruals in order to maximize their earnings-based compensa-
tion, Jones (1991) focuses on managers’ earnings management activities to aﬀect the outcomes
of import relief investigations, and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), and Sweeney (1994) suggest
that companies manage earnings in order to avoid violating debt-covenants. Some studies take
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a more general approach by investigating whether under all circumstances managers have an
economic or psychological incentive to exceed certain thresholds, such as prior year earnings
or ﬁnancial analysts’ consensus earnings forecast (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge
et al. 1998).
The central idea underlying these studies is that management bases its accrual decisions
on the earnings level in the current ﬁscal year. These decisions therefore do not convey infor-
mation about management’s estimate of future earnings and cause current reported accruals
to be less informative. On the contrary, discretionary accruals can be informative to investors
and ﬁnancial analysts when these accruals are systematically associated with future ﬁnan-
cial performance. This may occur, for example, when managers smooth reported earnings
in anticipation of future earnings (see DeFond and Park 1997) or when managers use the
discretionary component of provisions to signal future proﬁtability (see e.g. Wahlen 1994).
This paper concerns the informativeness of the discretionary component in Dutch com-
panies’ provisions. It assumes that these discretionary components can convey private infor-
mation about future proﬁtability in two diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst way is that management
decreases (increases) discretionary accruals when it expects that future earnings will be lower
(higher) than current earnings (hereafter referred to as earnings smoothing). DeFond and
Park (1997) ﬁnd empirical support for this type of earnings management where managers
smooth earnings in anticipation of future earnings. In their view managers’ rationale for
this type of earnings management is that they avoid reporting low earnings that could have
resulted in dismissal by borrowing from the future, and conversely, save for future bad times
when current performance is good. The central idea underlying the study of DeFond and Park
(1997) is that the monitors of the company focus much more on current performance than on
past performance in evaluating company management (see also Fudenberg and Tirole 1995).
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This results in the fact that aligning current reported earnings with previously reported earn-
ings is less useful to managers than aligning current reported earnings with future expected
earnings by borrowing from or saving for the future when necessary.
If management exercises its discretion in this particular way and consistently over time,
reported earnings will ultimately be less variable than reported earnings in absence of ma-
nipulation. Motivations for earnings smoothing that are based on reductions in earnings
variability have been oﬀered by Lev and Kunitzky (1974) and Trueman and Titman (1988).
They argue that earnings smoothing may be proﬁtable as soon as outsiders are no longer able
to diﬀerentiate between ‘accounting’ smoothing and ‘real’ smoothing. Real smoothing aﬀects
risk measures and could therefore have economic consequences.
The second way in which management can communicate private information about future
performance is by strategically disclosing or withholding good versus bad news (hereafter
referred to as signalling). In this context companies that expect good (poor) future per-
formance voluntarily choose income-decreasing (income-increasing) accruals (see Teoh and
Hwang 1991; Healy and Palepu 1993; Frantz 1999). Credible signalling can only occur when
the costs of the signal increases as a function of the size of the signal and when these costs are
lower for companies expecting good future performance than for companies expecting poor fu-
ture performance. Such a situation can arise when changes in provisions aﬀect management’s
earnings-based compensation.2 Several studies provide empirical evidence that management
exercises its discretion in this way. For instance, Wahlen (1994) ﬁnds that increases in unex-
pected loan loss provisions signal good news and are associated with a positive stock market
reaction. Other examples are the studies that ﬁnd that announcements of discretionary re-
structuring charges lead to positive market reactions (e.g. Bunsis 1997; Brickley and Van
Drunen 1990), or positive revisions of long-horizon growth forecasts (Chaney et al. 1999).
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Dutch legislation on the use of provisions is fairly ﬂexible and therefore provides a set-
ting in which many provisions are highly discretionary. In general, in determining provisions
managers should adhere to the following two rules: (1) risks or contingencies causing the
recognition of a provision must be speciﬁc, and (2) the future ﬁnancial impact must be rea-
sonably estimable. Although future losses and liabilities have to be probable, Dutch regulation
requires no further (quantitative) speciﬁcations with respect to the likelihood that an event
will occur. This study considers provisions for warranty costs, provisions for underinsured
property, provisions for maintenance costs and non-speciﬁed ‘other’ provisions. Provisions for
maintenance costs, which purpose is to spread expenses for major maintenance over years,
and provisions for underinsured property are highly discretionary and not allowed under Inter-
national Accounting Standards or US GAAP. This makes these provisions extremely useful
in studying the phenomena of earnings smoothing and signalling described above. Dutch
companies also have considerable discretion in reporting ‘other’ provisions, since these consist
of diﬀerent provisions of which only the nature is speciﬁed in the notes to the annual state-
ments. Although the separate components of other provisions are small, in aggregate these
provisions can have a signiﬁcant impact on reported earnings. In the sample under examina-
tion in this study absolute values of changes in other provisions are 13.5% of net income on
average (median 2.0%).
Consistent with Dutch regulation and International Accounting Standards I deﬁne pro-
visions as an estimated liability. This means that increases in provisions are equivalent to
negative accruals and decreases in provisions are equivalent to positive accruals. I further
deﬁne expected changes in provisions as changes in provisions that investors and analysts can
expect on the basis of the information that is available to them about a company’s change in
operating activity or asset base.
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Management has discretion in recognizing unexpected changes in provisions. With respect
to the recognition of unexpected changes in provisions, managers who aim to smooth earnings
minimize the recognized changes in provisions when they expect that earnings will increase
next year and maximize the recognized changes when they expect that earnings will decrease
next year. Managers who engage in signalling display the opposite behaviour. Signalling
would result in a situation where only companies that expect next year’s earnings to decrease
(‘bad news’ companies) report unexpected decreases in provisions and only companies that
expect next year’s earnings to increase (‘good news’ companies) report unexpected increases
in provisions. The signalling theory therefore predicts that reported unexpected changes in
provisions are positively associated with expected changes in earnings. Earnings smoothing
would result in a situation where only ‘bad news’ companies report unexpected increases in
provisions and only ‘good news’ companies report unexpected decreases in provisions. The
earnings smoothing theory therefore predicts that reported unexpected changes in provisions
are negatively associated with expected changes in earnings. According to both theories
‘bad news’ companies and ‘good news’ companies can decide not to recognize unexpected
changes in provisions. Reporting no unexpected changes in provisions therefore does not
convey information about future proﬁtability.
I do not have prior expectations on managers’ choice between earnings smoothing or
signalling. However, in the next sections I argue that diﬀerences in corporate structure and
board eﬀectiveness of Dutch companies aﬀect the extent to which Dutch managers engage in
informative provision management.
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(ii) Governance structures
The corporate governance system in the Netherlands has some characteristics that are unique
in an international perspective. In conformity with some other continental European com-
panies, Dutch companies generally have a two-tier board structure. The existence of a Man-
agement Board and a Supervisory Board implies that executive and supervisory (monitoring)
responsibilities are formally separated. Dutch regulation governing the corporate structure
of public companies diﬀers from regulation in other continental European countries in that it
provides four alternative legal regimes: (i) the structure regime, (ii) the mitigated structure
regime, (iii) the exempted regime, and (iv) the common regime. The structure law, which
introduced these regimes in 1971, governs the corporate structure of Dutch companies with
more than 100 employees and common equity in excess of 25 million (GLD). In short, this
law devolves the following authorities of common shareholders to the Supervisory Board: (1)
the authority to appoint and dismiss management, and (2) the right to make amendments
to the annual ﬁnancial statements. Furthermore, the Supervisory Board obtains the right
to veto strategic decisions made by the Management Board, such as new equity issues, large
investments, or massive dismissal.
Companies with more than 100 employees and common equity in excess of 25 million may
be exempt from the structure law because of one of the following two reasons. First, the re-
spective companies are the corporate headquarters of a multinational corporation and employ
more than 50% of their employees outside the Netherlands. The exempted regime applies to
these companies. Second, the respective companies are part of a multinational corporation
and employ more than 50% of their employees outside the Netherlands. The mitigated struc-
ture regime applies to these companies. The common regime applies to companies with less
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than 100 employees or common equity less than 25 million (GLD). Companies exempt from
the structure law may voluntarily choose to be a structure company.
For the purpose of this study it is suﬃcient to make a distinction between structure com-
panies, i.e. those companies that are subject to the structure regime, and non-structure com-
panies, i.e. those companies that are subject to the common regime, the mitigated structure
regime or the exempted regime. In this context structure companies diﬀer from non-structure
companies in that only supervisors of the former type of companies have the authority to dis-
miss management and the right to make amendments to the annual statements. Supervisors
of non-structure companies can suspend managers from their oﬃce, however, shareholders of
these companies retain the ultimate authority to dismiss the managers. Approximately 75%
of the listed Dutch companies are structure companies.
Table 1 summarizes the diﬀerences between structure companies and non-structure com-
panies. The fourth column of table 1 (Appointment) shows an additional diﬀerence between
the four regimes. Members of the Supervisory Board of all companies represent diﬀerent
groups of stakeholders and are legally bound to act in the interests of all stakeholders (e.g.
creditors, employees, shareholders). However, only supervisors of companies that are sub-
ject to the common regime or the exempted regime are elected at the General Shareholders’
Meeting. Supervisors of companies that are subject to the structure regime or the mitigated
structure regime are appointed by co-optation. This may inﬂuence the orientation of the
Supervisory Board. Since the Dutch law prescribes that supervisors can only be dismissed by
those who have appointed them, supervisors of non-structure companies, who are elected by
shareholders, are more likely to act in the interests of shareholders than supervisors of struc-
ture companies, who are appointed by co-optation.3 Furthermore, appointing by co-optation
may shield supervisors from management’s power and insulate them against ejection after
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an unsuccessful dissent, increasing the frequency of open dissent from the Supervisory Board
and consequently increasing board eﬀectiveness (Warther 1998).
[Table 1 about here.]
The ﬁfth column of table 1 (Board eﬀectiveness) shows my expectations on the con-
sequences of the diﬀerences between structure companies and non-structure companies for
supervisors’ disciplinary power over company management. I expect that supervisors of
structure companies can exercise more eﬀective discipline over company management than
supervisors of non-structure companies. The reason for this is that the Supervisory Board of
structure companies can eﬀectively impose restrictions on management’s discretion by threat-
ening to veto strategic decisions, amend the ﬁnancial statements or dismiss management.4
Appointment by co-optation further increases board independence and board eﬀectiveness,
as argued above.
Since supervisors’ ability to eﬀectively monitor management of non-structure companies
is limited, the question arises whether alternative disciplinary mechanisms are present to con-
trol management of these companies. In the Netherlands hostile takeovers rarely occur since
Dutch companies dispose of a wide range of takeover defence mechanisms.5 Therefore, the
market for corporate control is virtually nonexistent. It is also not likely that Dutch common
shareholders eﬀectively monitor company management. First, disciplinary power of common
shareholders is low since they are fragmented and generally have a passive attitude that is
partly the consequence the accepted takeover defence mechanisms, limiting their voting power.
Second, some non-structure companies allow holders of priority shares, which are issued to a
friendly foundation, to make binding recommendations to the General Shareholders’ Meeting
for the appointment of members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board. As a re-
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sult shareholders’ inﬂuence on board composition is limited and the Management Board may
dominate the election of supervisors. These restrictions on the disciplinary role of the Dutch
market for corporate control and the General Shareholders’ Meeting suggest that the Super-
visory Board remains the most relevant monitoring mechanism of non-structure companies,
although its eﬀectiveness is expected to be low, as argued above.
In summary, this study makes a distinction between structure companies and non-structure
companies. Structure companies diﬀer from non-structure companies in that the Supervisory
Board of structure companies is more independent and has higher disciplinary power over
company management than the Supervisory Board of non-structure companies. These unique
properties of the Dutch corporate systems oﬀer the opportunity to eﬀectively measure the
eﬃcacy of outsiders’ supervision and avoid the use of proxies such as the proportion of out-
side members on the Executive Board, the presence of an external blockholder, or managerial
ownership (see e.g. Warﬁeld et al. 1995; Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley 1996).
(iii) Hypotheses and research design
The objective of this study is to investigate whether corporate structure inﬂuences the extent
to which Dutch listed companies make use of the discretionary component in provisions to
communicate private information to shareholders. The study implicitly assumes that when
possible, managers use their discretion in ﬁnancial reporting to reduce the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry between management and shareholders, as evidenced, amongst others, by
Subramanyam (1996), Bartov and Bodnar (1996) and Beatty and Harris (1998). Managers’
incentive to do so is that improved communication with shareholders is beneﬁcial to the com-
pany since it corrects mispricing and reduces the company’s cost of capital (see e.g. Healy
and Palepu 1993).
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Based on the idea that reported unexpected changes in provisions are informative to
investors and analysts, I predict that unexpected changes in provisions are associated with
abnormal stock returns and analysts’ abnormal forecast revisions, either positively (signalling)
or negatively (earnings smoothing). However, I expect that the informativeness of provision
management decreases when the eﬀectiveness of the Supervisory Board increases. Using unex-
pected changes in provisions for the purpose of earnings smoothing or signalling implies that
under certain conditions companies should aggressively recognize unexpected decreases in pro-
visions. Powerful Supervisory Boards most likely force management to report conservatively,
i.e. only recognize unexpected increases in provisions, thereby not allowing management to
use provisions for the purpose of earnings smoothing or signalling. This implies that reported
unexpected changes in provisions of companies with powerful, eﬀective supervision are not
informative and therefore not associated with abnormal stock returns and abnormal forecast
revisions. The idea that eﬀective boards restrain earnings management is consistent with the
empirical results of Beasley (1996), Dechow et al. (1996) and Peasnell et al. (1998).
In the previous section I argued that structure companies have more eﬀective Supervisory
Boards than non-structure companies. I therefore predict that provision management of non-
structure companies is more informative than provision management of structure companies.
The following hypothesis applies:
H1: Unexpected changes in provisions of structure companies are less informative and there-
fore less associated with abnormal stock returns and analysts’ abnormal forecast revi-
sions around the announcement of provisions than unexpected changes in provisions of
non-structure companies.
Alternatively, since the authority to dismiss management of structure companies is in
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the hands of a powerful, eﬀective Supervisory Board, managers of structure companies may
have stronger incentive to smooth reported earnings relative to managers of non-structure
companies, as suggested by DeFond and Park (1997) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1995). If
stricter oversight does not reduce the opportunity to manage provisions, unexpected changes
in provisions of structure companies can be negatively associated with abnormal stock returns
and abnormal forecast revisions.
The central idea underlying hypothesis 1 is that managers use their discretion to com-
municate with shareholders and reduce the degree of information asymmetry. This suggests
that unexpected changes in provisions are more informative when the degree of information
asymmetry and the need for improved communication is high. Additionally, Holthausen and
Verrecchia (1988) indicate that the market response to an information release should increase
as a function of the level of uncertainty about a company’s future performance prior to the
information release. Therefore, I expect that the market reaction to unexpected changes in
provisions of non-structure companies increases with the degree of information asymmetry.
H2: The market reaction to unexpected changes in provisions of non-structure companies is
more pronounced when the degree of information asymmetry between management and
shareholders is high.
I have no prior expectation on the relationship between the degree of information asym-
metry and the market reaction to unexpected changes in provisions of structure compa-
nies. When supervisors of structure companies discourage informative provision management
in all circumstances, the market reaction is not associated with the degree of information
asymmetry.6
In order to investigate the stock market reaction to the disclosure of unexpected changes
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in provisions, I estimate the following equation using provision data of 90 companies that
were publicly listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange from 1989 to 1997:
ARit = α0 + α1∆Eit + α2UPit + α3INFOASYMit + α4INFOASYMitUPit + εit (1)
in which ARit denotes the cumulative abnormal stock return on the day of and the ﬁrst
day after the disclosure of the annual ﬁnancial statements, ∆Eit equals the annual change
in reported earnings before adjustments to provisions, and UPit denotes the size of unex-
pected changes in provisions. Both independent variables are scaled by lagged total assets.
INFOASYMit is a variable that proxies for the degree of information asymmetry between
managers and shareholders. The earnings variable should control for the eﬀect of the earn-
ings announcement. It is likely that a large part of the earnings information has already been
incorporated into stock prices, since most companies make preliminary earnings announce-
ments before the disclosure date of the ﬁnancial statements. In a second regression I replace
ARit with UREVit, which denotes ﬁnancial analysts’ abnormal earnings forecast revision. In
the next section I will explain in further detail the estimation of the variables used in the
regression analysis.
In this study I avoid making arbitrary assumptions about the expected behaviour of accru-
als by focusing on largely discretionary provisions and by assuming that market participants
are able to at least partly capture the information that is conveyed by managers’ manipula-
tions of provisions. This implies that when provisions are managed in particular situations,
share price reactions and earnings forecast revisions may diﬀer in these situations, as described
above. I realize that it is possible that the assumption about market participants’ abilities
to interpret the eﬀect of earnings management is not valid, which may weaken the empirical
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results. For example, Bartov et al. (1998) indicate that investors do not fully understand
the cash ﬂow implications of write-oﬀs. However, the analysis will capture the eﬀect of earn-
ings management as soon as investors and analysts suspect that management manipulates
provisions and immediately act on their suspicion. Hence, the analysis does not require full
understanding of the economic consequences.
3 Sample selection and variable definitions
(i) Earnings forecasts and share prices
The analysis of ﬁnancial analysts’ response to unexpected changes in provisions concerns an-
alysts’ abnormal forecast revisions in the ﬁrst two months after the announcement date. The
necessity to estimate abnormal forecast revisions follows from the following two characteris-
tics of analysts’ revisions. First, since ﬁnancial analysts do not revise their estimates in every
month, forecast revisions are generally serially correlated. That is, if all analysts revise their
earnings’ forecasts every ﬁve months on average, approximately 80% of the information that
they incorporate into their forecast revisions has been released in the previous four months
and has consequently been reﬂected in previous forecast revisions.7 Second, evidence exists
that analysts are positively biased but systematically lower their forecasts when the forecast
horizon decreases. In sum, this implies that monthly revisions are (1) negative on average
and (2) to some extent based on information that is released in previous months. Therefore,
I estimate abnormal revisions using the following procedure (see also Brous and Kini 1993).
First, I use the individual earnings forecasts provided by I/B/E/S to construct monthly
consensus forecasts from 1989 to 1997. In this study these months do not run parallel with
calendar months but are deﬁned as four week periods centred on the announcement date.
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I compute the consensus forecasts by averaging the individual forecasts, where I include
individual forecasts up to the month in which a revised forecast is submitted. The consensus
forecast revision (REVit) of ﬁrm i in month t has the following deﬁnition:
REVit =
Fit − Fi,t−1
Piy
(2)
in which Fit and Piy denote the consensus earnings per share forecast in month t and share
price of ﬁrm i at the beginning of the ﬁscal year y.
Second, I divide the consensus revision into an abnormal and an expected component.
The expected forecast revisions has the following deﬁnition (cf. Brous and Kini 1993):
EREVit = EBIASi +Σ4n=10.2 UREVi,t−n (3)
in which EBIASi equals the average revisions during the estimation period consisting of
months -6 to 6, and UREVi,t−n denotes the abnormal revision in month t-n. Since analysts
appear to revise their estimates every ﬁve months on average, I expect that forecast revisions of
month t are correlated with revisions of months t-4 to t-1. The expected forecast revisions thus
equals the sum of the average revision EBIASi and the weighted average of the unexpected
forecast revisions of the previous four months, where I assign these equal weights (0.2).
This study also considers the abnormal stock market reaction to the disclosure of provi-
sions. Share prices come from Datastream. Daily stock returns have the following deﬁnition:
Rik =
Pik − Pi,k−1
Pi,k−1
(4)
in which Pik denotes the share price of ﬁrm i at day k. Daily abnormal stock returns equal the
diﬀerence between the observed stock returns and expected stock returns based on a market
model. I estimate the market model parameters over a 140-trading-day period which ends
25 days prior to the announcement date. 8 The source of the event dates is Het Financieele
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Dagblad, a Dutch daily ﬁnancial newspaper. I assume that the dates of the announcements
of unexpected provisions correspond with the dates of publication of the annual ﬁnancial
statements.
The variability of the abnormal stock returns estimated as the residuals of the market
model represent the nonsystematic risk of the ﬁrm’s stock. Since the level of nonsystematic
risk is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, the use of Ordinary Least Squares regressions likely produces ﬁrm-speciﬁc
variances of the error term and yields ineﬃcient parameter estimates. Therefore, I use Gen-
eralized Least Squares regressions, where I weight the dependent and independent variables
with the (ﬁrm-year-speciﬁc) standard deviation of the daily abnormal returns during the
estimation period.
A similar argument holds when abnormal revisions are the dependent variable. When
ﬁnancial analysts have heterogeneous beliefs about a ﬁrm’s future performance, they may
not react unequivocally to publicly released information. The variance of the error term of
OLS regressions therefore depends on the idiosyncrasy of analysts’ perceptions of the observed
event. Abnormal forecast revisions reﬂect analysts’ interpretation of new information but also
the extent to which analysts’ interpretation of previously disclosed information in month t
diﬀers from analysts’ interpretation in month t-n. Hence, high variance of abnormal forecast
revisions probably implies that analysts’ beliefs about the future prospects of a ﬁrm are
heterogeneous. In the forecast revision regressions I therefore weight the dependent and
independent variables with the (ﬁrm-year-speciﬁc) standard deviation of analysts’ monthly
abnormal forecast revisions for months −6 to −1.
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(ii) Estimation of unexpected provisions
An inventory of reported provisions during 1989 to 1997 indicates that Dutch companies report
three diﬀerent categories of provisions on a regular basis. These categories are: (1) provisions
for warranty costs (30% of the examined ﬁnancial statements), (2) provisions for underinsured
property (20.2%), and (3) provisions for maintenance costs (16.7%). Furthermore, 64.2% of
the examined companies report non-speciﬁed ‘other’ provisions, which are likely to consist of
one or more of the above provisions. These four categories of provisions are central to this
investigation.
In order to estimate the unexpected component of reported changes in provisions, I assume
that investors and ﬁnancial analysts associate each type of provision with a speciﬁc item in the
annual ﬁnancial statements. I predict changes in provisions for warranty costs as a function of
the change in sales; changes in provisions for underinsured property as a function of the change
in gross property, plant and equipment; and changes in provisions for maintenance costs as a
function of the change in accumulated depreciation. The residuals of these regressions equal
the unexpected changes in the respective provisions.
The central idea underlying the estimation of unexpected changes in other provisions is
that these provisions likely consist of provisions for warranty costs, provisions for underinsured
property or provisions for maintenance costs, if these provisions are not reported separately.
Hence, I predict changes in other provisions as a function of the change in sales, the change in
gross property, plant and equipment and the change in accumulated depreciation. However, I
set the value of these variables equal to zero if the provision that is associated with this variable
is reported separately in the ﬁnancial statements. That is, unexpected other provisions equal
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the residuals of the following regression:
OPit = β0 + β1D1∆Sit + β2D2∆PPEit + β3D3∆ACCDEPit + it (5)
in which OPit denotes changes in total other provisions, ∆Sit equals the change in sales,
∆PPEit equals the change in gross property, plant and equipment and ∆ACCDEPit equals
the change in accumulated depreciation. D1,D2 and D3 are indicator variables that equal
one if the ﬁnancial statements do not contain separate disclosures of provisions for warranty
costs, provisions for underinsured property and provisions for maintenance costs respectively.
The residual, it, represents my estimate of unexpected changes in other provisions.9 Table 2
presents the estimated coeﬃcients of the regression analysis. In order to size-adjust changes in
provisions, I estimate all unexpected changes in provisions by using Generalized Least Squares
regressions where I weight the dependent and independent variables with lagged total assets.
[Table 2 about here.]
In the sample used throughout this study the mean absolute value of the estimated un-
expected changes in provisions equals 18.6% of earnings before provisions (median 4.2%).
Hence, this set of (largely) discretionary accruals is clearly identiﬁable, but also large enough
to matter, which is a necessary condition for a potentially successful account-speciﬁc approach
(see Schipper 1989).
(iii) Information asymmetry
Previous research has produced many proxies for the degree of information asymmetry be-
tween managers and common shareholders, since actual information asymmetry is not mea-
surable. This study considers a set of ﬁve of these proxy variables and uses factor analysis to
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extract the common variance and construct factors scores. The variables reﬂecting the degree
of information asymmetry are:
1. Level of analyst following: This variable equals the number of analysts that submitted
to I/B/E/S one or more earnings forecasts. I expect that the level of analyst following
is negatively correlated with the degree of information asymmetry, since the number of
informed traders increases with analysts following (see e.g. Brennan and Subrahmanyam
1995);
2. Financial analysts’ consensus forecast error: I measure the consensus forecast error as
the absolute diﬀerence between actual earnings and the mean of the last earnings fore-
casts that analysts submitted. Barron et al. (1998) indicate that the consensus forecast
error reﬂects the error in (analysts’ interpretation of) publicly available information, i.e.
common error, and part of the error in analysts’ private information, i.e. idiosyncratic
error, that is not completely eliminated by combining individual forecasts when the
number of available forecasts is small. I expect analysts’ consensus forecast error to be
positively correlated with the degree of information asymmetry;
3. Financial analysts’ forecast dispersion: Forecast dispersion equals the standard devia-
tion of the last earnings forecasts that analysts submitted. This variable reﬂects the
idiosyncratic noise in analysts’ private information. I expect analysts’ forecast disper-
sion to be positively correlated with the degree of information asymmetry;
4. Volatility of abnormal stock returns during the estimation period: This variable equals
the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period;
5. Volatility of abnormal stock returns during the event period: This variable equals the
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standard deviation of daily stock returns during the event period. My expectations are
that the volatility of abnormal stock returns during the estimation period and during the
announcement period are positively correlated with the level of information asymmetry
(see e.g. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999).
The rationale for using factor analysis is that each of the above variables is a noisy measure of
the degree of information asymmetry. Factor analysis determines the variance in each variable
that is shared with the other variables and eliminates variance that is uniquely related to one
variable from the information asymmetry measure.10 In a conﬁrmatory factor analysis, the
estimated loadings of the above ﬁve items have the expected sign and are signiﬁcant at the
0.01 alpha level.
4 Empirical results
(i) Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of ﬁrm size, information asymmetry, stock ownership and
provisions for structure and non-structure companies. It appears from these statistics that the
examined non-structure companies are larger on average than structure companies in terms of
total assets (12,745 versus 1,363) and net sales (15,723 versus 1,951). Furthermore, the average
values of the information asymmetry measure, the fraction of common shares outstanding
held by the largest blockholder and the fraction of shares outstanding held by the CEO,
indicate that non-structure companies have lower information asymmetry on average than
structure companies (−0.1588 versus 0.0264), higher concentration of stock ownership (0.2626
versus 0.2026) and CEOs owning a larger fraction of common shares outstanding (0.0805
versus 0.0088).11 Ignoring diﬀerences in board eﬀectiveness, these diﬀerences in the degree
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of information asymmetry and concentrated stock ownership would imply that especially
management of structure companies uses provisions to communicate with shareholders, given
that the level of informative provision management increases as a function of information
asymmetry, as argued in the previous section, and decreases as a function of the degree of
supervision by shareholders. This would be contrary to my prediction.
[Table 3 about here.]
The average level of provisions, deﬁned as the sum of provisions for warranty costs, pro-
visions for underinsured property, provisions for maintenance costs and ‘other’ provisions,
scaled by lagged total assets, is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between structure companies and
non-structure companies. This suggests that these provisions are equally important to both
types of companies. Unexpected changes in provisions, scaled by lagged total assets, are
higher on average for structure companies than for non-structure companies (0.0005 versus
-0.0001). This is consistent with the idea that structure companies report more conserva-
tively than non-structure companies, recognizing unexpected increases in provisions but not
recognizing unexpected decreases in provisions, since structure companies have more eﬀective
supervision.
(ii) Univariate analysis
Panel A of table 4 shows the abnormal stock returns and abnormal forecast revisions sur-
rounding the announcement of unexpected changes provisions.12 I split the sample according
to the sign of these changes, removing 85 ﬁrm-year observations with zero unexpected changes.
The results indicate that on days 0 and +1 abnormal stock returns are higher when provi-
sions increase unexpectedly than when provisions decrease unexpectedly. The diﬀerence is
22
moderately signiﬁcant on day 0 (t=1.94, p<0.10). The stock market reaction on the ﬁrst
trading day after the announcement date, i.e. day +1, is also relevant as some of the compa-
nies included in the sample announced their annual results after the exchange closing hours.
The cumulative abnormal stock return for day 0 to +1, reported in panel B of table 4, is
signiﬁcantly higher at the alpha 0.05 level when provisions increase unexpectedly than when
they decrease unexpectedly (diﬀerence 0.8107, t=2.33). This is consistent with the idea that
unexpected increases in provisions are used to signal ‘good’ future performance.
Consistent with the stock market reaction, analysts’ abnormal forecast revisions, reported
in panel C of table 4, are higher when provisions increase unexpectedly. The diﬀerences
are not signiﬁcant and the greatest when revisions are measured over a four-month period
starting in month 0 (diﬀerence 0.6591, t=1.43). This may indicate that either in the months
after the announcement month analysts receive and incorporate information that conﬁrms the
information reﬂected by the unexpected changes in provisions or some forecast revisions in the
announcement month are not based on the information reﬂected by the unexpected changes
in provisions. The latter explanation implies that submission dates reported by I/B/E/S may
not correspond to analysts’ actual revision date. In order to allow for this possibility but to
minimize the inﬂuence of information disclosed after the announcement month, I use forecast
revisions for month 0 to +1 in the revision regressions that are discussed in the next section.
[Table 4 about here.]
In order to investigate whether analysts and investors (1) anticipate the unexpected
changes in provisions, or (2) underreact to the announcement and correct for the under-
reaction in the post-event period, I report abnormal stock returns and abnormal forecast
revisions during the pre-event period and post-event period in table 5. The results indicate
that analysts may anticipate unexpected changes in provisions during the months −6 to −4.
23
The diﬀerence in abnormal forecast revisions equals 0.4433 (t=1.82, p<0.10). There is no
indication that abnormal stock returns are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent during the pre-event period
or the post-event period.
[Table 5 about here.]
(iii) Multivariate analysis
Table 6 reports the estimated coeﬃcients of regression equation (1), where the dependent
variables equal the cumulative abnormal stock returns for day 0 to +1 and analysts’ forecast
revisions for month 0 to +1. Column SC (NSC) shows the coeﬃcients of the sample consisting
of structure companies (non-structure companies). Column NSC-SC shows the diﬀerences
between coeﬃcients reported in columns NSC and SC.13
[Table 6 about here.]
The results reported in table 6 conﬁrm hypothesis 1, that abnormal stock returns and
analysts’ abnormal forecast revisions are less correlated with unexpected changes in provi-
sions of structure companies than with unexpected changes in provisions of non-structure
companies, and hypothesis 2, that the market reaction to unexpected changes in provisions of
structure companies is more pronounced when the degree of information asymmetry between
management and shareholders increases. The parameter estimates of the return regressions
indicate that unexpected increases in provisions cause a positive share price reaction, both
for structure companies and non-structure companies (t=2.27, p<0.05 and t=3.11, p<0.01
respectively). The diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients on unexpected changes in provisions of
both companies is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 alpha level. This suggests that the fact that super-
visors of structure companies exercise more eﬀective discipline over company management,
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results in the situation where these companies use provisions to a lesser extent for the purpose
of signalling. This is consistent with hypothesis 1.
The coeﬃcient on INFOASYMitUPit is signiﬁcantly positive at the 0.01 alpha level for non-
structure companies (t=3.26). This means that the market reaction is more pronounced when
the degree of information asymmetry increases, as hypothesis 2 predicted. The signiﬁcantly
positive diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients of the two diﬀerent types of ﬁrms (t=2.29, p<0.05)
conﬁrms that the incentive to signal is especially present for managers of non-structure com-
panies with a high degree of information asymmetry, as argued in the previous section.
The results of the revision regressions are consistent with the results of the return regres-
sions. The coeﬃcient on UPit is signiﬁcantly positive for both type of companies (t=2.07,
p<0.05 for structure companies; t=2.62, p<0.01 for non-structure companies). The diﬀer-
ence between both types is positive and signiﬁcant at the 0.05 alpha level. The coeﬃcient on
INFOASYMitUPit is signiﬁcantly higher for non-structure companies (t=1.79, p<0.10). In
sum, the empirical results suggest that management uses unexpected changes in provisions to
signal ‘good news’. However, eﬀective discipline exercised by the powerful Supervisory Board
of structure companies restrains this type of informative provision management. The market
reaction to unexpected changes in provisions of non-structure companies increases with the
degree of information asymmetry.
(iv) Sensitivity analysis
Alternative governance variables
The previous analysis focused on governance structures that are typical for companies listed
on the Dutch stock exchange. The underlying assumption is that the disciplinary power of
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Dutch shareholders is low, which calls for a functional Supervisory Board. However, two
situations can arise in which the diﬀerence between structure companies and non-structure
companies disappears. This may result in an underestimation of the eﬀect of the structure
law. First, the members of the Supervisory Board and the members of the Executive Board
may collude. In such a case the disciplinary power of the Supervisory Board of a structure
company is probably not signiﬁcantly higher than the disciplinary power of the common
shareholders of non-structure companies. Collusion of supervisors and managers of struc-
ture companies therefore reduces diﬀerences in board eﬀectiveness. A similar situation may
arise when a manager of a structure company owns a large fraction of the company’s shares,
increasing management’s power. Second, shareholders of companies exempt from the struc-
ture law may seek for alternative disciplinary mechanisms, such as ownership concentration,
and consequently reduce the diﬀerences in monitoring quality between their companies and
structure companies.
To examine the eﬀect of three alternative governance variables, I estimate the following
equation:
ARit = γ0 + γ1∆Eit + γ2UPit + γ3INFOASYMit + γ4INFOASYMitUPit+
γ5OUTBLOCKitUPit + γ6MANBLOCKitUPit+
γ7SUPEXECitUPit + ηit (6)
in which OUTBLOCKit, a proxy for ownership concentration, denotes the percentage of
common shares outstanding held by the largest outside blockholder, MANBLOCKit denotes
the percentage of common shares outstanding held by the CEO, if he is the largest blockholder,
SUPEXECit, a proxy for the chance of collusion, equals the ratio of the number of supervisors
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and the number of executives, and the remaining variables are as deﬁned in the previous
sections. In a second regression I replace ARit with UREVit.
[Table 7 about here.]
Table 7 shows the results of the regression analysis. The abnormal return regression yields
coeﬃcients on OUTBLOCKitUPit and MANBLOCKitUPit that are only statistically signif-
icant for non-structure companies (t=-2.14, p<0.05 and t=1.70, p<0.10, respectively). The
abnormal revision regression yields a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between coeﬃcients of
structure companies and non-structure companies on OUTBLOCKitUPit (t=-2.13, p,0.05).
This emphasizes that shareholders of structure companies have low disciplinary power since
some important authorities devolved to the Supervisory Board, reducing the inﬂuence of stock
ownership concentration and management’s voting power. The results weakly indicate that
increased ownership concentration of non-structure companies can reduce the diﬀerences in
informative provision management between structure companies and non-structure compa-
nies. Coeﬃcients on UP and INFOASYMitUPit for structure companies remain signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from those for non-structure companies and the diﬀerences appear to be slightly
more signiﬁcant than those reported in table 6 (regression equation without the alternative
governance variables). These results are consistent with my expectation that shareholders
of non-structure companies reduce monitoring problems by means of alternative disciplinary
mechanisms, as argued above. The ratio of the number of supervisors and the number of
executives, which proxies for the chance of collusion, is insigniﬁcant for all samples.
Alternative return and revisions intervals
Dependent variables in the regression analyses discussed in the previous section were the
cumulative abnormal stock return for day 0 to +1 and analysts’ abnormal forecast revisions
27
for month 0 to +1. I also considered diﬀerent return and revision intervals to assess the
sensitivity of the parameter estimates to the choice for a speciﬁc interval. Table 8 reports
the diﬀerences between parameter estimates of structure companies and estimates of non-
structure companies. The results for the ﬁve-days return interval (days −2 to +2) and three-
days return interval (days −1 to +1) are qualitatively similar to the results presented in
table 6. However, it appears from these estimates that the signiﬁcance of diﬀerences between
structure companies and non-structure companies decreases when the length of the return
interval increases.
When abnormal forecast revisions in month 0 are the dependent variable, the results are
also qualitatively similar to the results reported in table 6. Using abnormal forecast revisions
for the months 0 to +3 as the dependent variable results in insigniﬁcant diﬀerences between
structure companies and non-structure companies. These forecast revisions probably impound
large amounts of other information than the information that is released on the announcement
date.
[Table 8 about here.]
Firm size
The descriptive statistics indicate that non-structure companies are larger than structure
companies on average. In order to investigate whether ﬁrm size drives the empirical results,
I split my sample into two subsamples with equal numbers of observations according to the
level of my proxy for information asymmetry and estimate the following regression equation:
ARit = δ0 + δ1∆Eit + δ2UPit + δ3STRUCTUREit + δ4STRUCTUREitUPit+
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δ5SIZEit + δ6SIZEitUPit + υit (7)
in which STRUCTUREit is an indicator variable that equals one if the company is a structure
company, SIZEit denotes the natural logarithm of net sales, and the remaining variables are
as deﬁned in the previous sections. In a second regression I replace ARit with UREVit.
The high information asymmetry subsample contains 51 observations of non-structure
companies. This equals 39.8% of the total set of observations of non-structure companies.
In this high information asymmetry subsample, the coeﬃcient on STRUCTUREitUPit equals
−1.3487 (t=−2.19, p<0.05) when abnormal stock returns are the dependent variable and
−2.3413 (t=−7.39, p<0.01) when abnormal forecast revisions are the dependent variable.
The coeﬃcient on STRUCTUREitUPit is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the low
information asymmetry subsample. The coeﬃcient on SIZEitUPit is not signiﬁcant in all
regressions.
These results indicate that ﬁrm size does not drive the empirical results. The signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcients on STRUCTUREitUPit in the high information asymmetry subsample are
consistent with the above results, that structure companies have less opportunity than non-
structure companies to engage in signalling when the degree of information asymmetry is
high.
5 Conclusions
This paper addresses the inﬂuence of corporate structure on the informativeness of reported
unexpected changes in provisions. It contributes to the earnings management literature by
focusing on governance structures and management’s discretion in ﬁnancial reporting in a
non-US market. The governance structures in the Netherlands provide a unique research op-
29
portunity, since two corporate systems with considerable diﬀerences in supervision coexist in
one market. The Dutch reported provisions that I analyse include provisions for maintenance
costs, provisions for underinsured property, which are both highly discretionary and not al-
lowed under International Accounting Standards and US GAAP, and non-speciﬁed ‘other’
provisions.
I compare structure companies, where the Supervisory Board can exercise eﬀective dis-
cipline over company management, with non-structure companies, where supervisors’ disci-
plinary power is low. The empirical evidence indicates that ﬁnancial analysts and investors
interpret unexpected increases (decreases) in provisions as ‘good’ news (‘bad’ news) about
future performance, if the company is a non-structure company. The market reaction to
unexpected changes in provisions of non-structure companies is more pronounced when my
estimate of information asymmetry between management and shareholders is high. Supervi-
sors of structure companies eﬀectively restrain this type of provision management, reducing
the informativeness of unexpected changes in provisions. The empirical results are therefore
consistent with the idea that management uses its discretion in reporting unexpected provi-
sions for the purpose of signalling future performance and reducing the degree of information
asymmetry. However, increases in the disciplinary power of the Supervisory Board reduce
management’s discretion and the information usefulness of reported provisions.
The empirical results add to the evidence of Subramanyam (1996), Bartov and Bodnar
(1996) and Beatty and Harris (1998), indicating that management may not necessarily use its
discretion opportunistically. Furthermore, given that previous research indicates that Dutch
ﬁnancial reporting is relatively informative, the results raise an interesting question. Are the
observed diﬀerences in informativeness between Dutch companies and non-Dutch companies
attributable to accounting decisions of structure companies or non-structure companies? The
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results highlight an important limitation of international comparisons of the value relevance
of accounting data focusing on international diﬀerences in ﬁnancial accounting and auditing
regulation. They indicate that international and national diﬀerences in corporate structure
can strongly inﬂuence the informativeness of ﬁnancial reporting. This is an area for future
research.
Notes
1Mueller et al. (1994) identify ﬁve accounting clusters based on international accounting similarities.
They characterize the Dutch approach as British-American and indicate that the British-American
accounting cluster should really be called the British-North American-Dutch cluster.
2Frantz (1999) proves analytically that a manager whose ﬁrm is about to restructure and whose
bonus depends on both ﬁrm value and accounting earnings, is induced to signal his private informa-
tion about the ﬁrm’s future proﬁtability by means of a restructuring provision. When current earnings
exceed the lower bound of the manager’s bonus plan prior to the restructuring, recognizing the re-
structuring costs will maximize the manager’s compensation only if the restructuring action is likely
to increase future earnings. In such a case the recognition of a restructuring provision, signalling ’good
news’, will increase current ﬁrm value, and advancing the recognition of restructuring expenses will
safeguard future earnings-based compensation. Furthermore, Frantz shows that in this situation the
share price reaction is a strictly increasing linear function of the size of the restructuring provision.
3One could argue that shareholder-oriented supervisors should favor conservative reporting (see
e.g. Ball et al. 2000). This would reduce the informativeness of unexpected changes in provisions of
non-structure companies (if the supervisors have the necessary disciplinary power) and be contrary to
my prediction.
4In practice, devolving the authority to make amendments to the annual statements to the Su-
pervisory Board is not likely to put large restrictions on management’s discretion. The Management
Board is probably better informed about true performance than the Supervisory Board. However,
when supervisors and managers disagree on the contents of the annual statements, such as accounting
procedures or provisions, supervisors of structure companies should have more inﬂuence on the out-
comes of such a conﬂict than supervisors on non-structure companies. On the other hand, supervisors
of non-structure companies retain the formal right not to approve the annual statements.
5For an inventory of these takeover defences, see Kabir et al. (1997)
6The degree of information asymmetry may be negatively associated with unexpected changes in
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provisions, if managers of structure companies have stronger incentive to smooth reported earnings
by means of provisions in order to avoid reporting low earnings that could have resulted in dismissal,
as suggested by DeFond and Park (1997). This is possible when the probability that managers are
dismissed based on ‘poor’ earnings performance depends on the availability of alternative indicators of
future performance. If the Supervisory Board accesses little alternative information, it is likely to base
its judgment on readily available earnings ﬁgures. This would induce managers of companies subject to
the structure law to smooth reported earnings when the degree of information asymmetry is high. An
implicit assumption is that the measured degree of information asymmetry between management and
shareholders proxies for the degree of information asymmetry between management and Supervisory
Board.
7Forecast submission dates in my sample reﬂect analysts’ tendency to revise their forecasts every
ﬁve months on average.
8I deﬁne the daily market return as the daily percentage change in total market capitalization of
the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.
9Decreases in provisions could also be associated with the use of provisions as a result of cash
outﬂows. For instance, an unexpected decrease in the provision for major maintenance could indicate
that the company started to carry out major maintenance work. This could add noise to the measure
of unexpected changes in provisions. However, since this applies to the provisions of all observed
companies, I do not expect that this will systematically aﬀect the empirical results.
10Including the last variable (volatility of abnormal stock returns during the event period) in my
information asymmetry measure may create spurious correlation. The greater the level of abnormal
stock return, the greater the measured volatility is likely to be. However, including the information
asymmetry measure as an independent variable in the regressions, should correct for this and insure
that the interaction term INFOASYMitUPit in regression equation 1 is not correlated with the depen-
dent variable by construction. Furthermore, results of the regression analysis, which are reported in
the next section, indicate that the information asymmetry measure is not signiﬁcantly correlated with
abnormal stock returns.
11I deﬁne the outside blockholder variable as the fraction of common shares outstanding that is
owned by the largest blockholder (not being management). Dutch legislation requires shareholders to
disclose the percentage of common shares outstanding that they own only if this percentage exceeds
ﬁve percent. In this study this percentage is assumed to be zero when no disclosure has taken place.
I deﬁne the management blockholder variable as the fraction of common shares outstanding that is
owned by the CEO is he is the largest blockholder.
12In the univariate analysis, I also weight abnormal stock returns with the (ﬁrm-year-speciﬁc) stan-
dard deviation of the daily abnormal returns during the estimation period and abnormal forecast
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revisions with the (ﬁrm-year-speciﬁc) standard deviation of analysts’ monthly abnormal forecast revi-
sions for months -6 to -1, in order to adjust for diﬀerences in unsystematic risk and diﬀerences in the
heterogeneity of analysts’ interpretations.
13I calculate the t-statistics of diﬀerences between parameters βnsci of model nsc and parameters β
sc
i
of model sc as follows:
tdiﬀi =
βnsci − βsci
[Var(all)]0.5[Var(bnsci )/Var(nsc) + Var(b
sc
i )/Var(sc)]0.5
(8)
in which:
Var(all) =
(nnsc − knsc − 1)Var(nsc) + (nsc − ksc − 1)Var(sc)
nnsc + nsc − knsc − ksc − 2 (9)
and Var(bnsci ) denotes the estimated variance of parameter estimate b
nsc
i , Var(
nsc) denotes the mean
squared error of model nsc, nnsc equals the number of observations used to estimate model nsc and
knsc equals the number of estimated parameters of model nsc.
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Table 1:
Characteristics of corporate structures and the eﬀectiveness of
Supervisory Boards in the Netherlands
Category Regime Authorities Appointment Board eﬀectiveness
Structure Structure - Dismiss management Co-optation High
companies - Amend annual report
- Veto strategic decisions
Non-structure Mitigated - Veto strategic decisions Co-optation Low
companies structure
Exempted - Shareholders’ Low
Meetinga
Common - Shareholders’ Low
Meetinga
a Members of the Supervisory Board of these companies are elected at the General Shareholders’
Meeting. However, the bylaws of these companies may prescribe that one third of the Supervisory
Board is elected by others than the company’s shareholders.
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Table 2:
Generalized Least Squares estimation of unexpected changes in
provisions
Dependent variable Intercept ∆S ∆PPE ∆ACCDEP F-value adjusted R2
Provision for warranty
costs (N=243)
−18.0231 0.0074 38.55† 13.43%
(−0.50) (6.21)†
Provision for
underinsured property
(N=164)
33.3630 0.0051 12.15† 6.40%
(1.20) (3.49)†
Provision for
maintenance costs
(N=135)
10.0646 0.0097 4.05† 2.23%
(0.34) (2.01)‡
Other provisions
(N=520)
112.4134 0.0057 0.0034 0.0173 7.71† 3.73%
(1.77)∗ (2.49)‡ (0.54) (1.63)
Notes:
Unexpected changes in provisions are estimated using Generalized Least Squares regressions, where I
weight the dependent and independent variables with lagged total assets. The independent variables
have the following deﬁnitions:
∆S= Annual change in net sales
∆PPE= Annual change in gross property, plant and equipment
∆ACCDEP= Annual change in accumulated depreciation
†,‡,∗ Signiﬁcant at the two-tailed 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 alpha level, respectively.
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Table 3:
Descriptive statistics of size, information asymmetry, stock
ownership and provisions
Standard Lower Upper
Variables Mean Deviation Quartile Median Quartile
Panel A: Non-structure companies (N=128)
Total assets 12,745 20,756 594 1,818 12,119
Net sales 15,723 25,435 852 2,851 13,538
Information asymmetry measure −0.1588 1.0068 −0.6617 −0.3420 0.1175
Outside blockholder 0.2626 0.2572 0.0000 0.1495 0.5328
Management blockholder 0.0805 0.1838 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Provisions 0.0239 0.0255 0.0032 0.0158 0.0451
Unexpected changes in provisions −0.0001 0.0095 −0.0027 −0.0001 0.0015
Panel B: Structure companies (N=443)
Total assets 1,363 2,604 261 482 1,123
Net sales 1,951 3,782 337 789 1,823
Information asymmetry measure 0.0264 0.9199 −0.4744 −0.2020 0.1862
Outside blockholder 0.2026 0.1732 0.0800 0.1400 0.2941
Management blockholder 0.0088 0.0498 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Provisions 0.0259 0.0300 0.0053 0.0145 0.0394
Unexpected changes in provisions 0.0005 0.0097 −0.0029 0.0000 0.0024
Notes:
Total assets denote the book value of total assets at ﬁscal year end (GLD millions); net sales
denotes net sales at ﬁscal year end (GLD millions); the information asymmetry measure
denotes the factor scores of the factor analysis on ﬁve information asymmetry proxies; outside
blockholder denotes the fraction of shares outstanding that is held by the largest blockholder
(not being the CEO); management blockholder denotes the fraction of shares outstanding
that is held by the CEO if he is the largest blockholder; provisions denote the book value of
provisions at ﬁscal year end scaled by lagged total assets; unexpected changes in provisions
denote the residuals of the Generalized Least Squares estimation procedure (reported in
table 2) scaled by lagged total assets. Data on total assets, net sales and provisions come
from the annual reports, stock ownership data come from Het Financieele Dagblad.
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Table 4:
Abnormal stock returns and analysts’ forecast revisions
surrounding the announcements of unexpected increases
(N=222) versus unexpected decreases (N=264) in provisions
Decreases Increases Diﬀerence
in provisions in provisions (Inc. - Dec.)
mean t-statistic mean t-statistic mean t-statistic
Panel A: Average abnormal stock returns
Day -2 0.0526 0.74 0.0618 0.75 0.0092 0.08
Day -1 0.3464 3.94† 0.2215 2.06‡ −0.1249 −0.91
Day 0 0.2306 1.48 0.6895 3.83† 0.4589 1.94∗
Day +1 0.0327 0.25 0.3845 2.13‡ 0.3518 1.58
Day +2 −0.0500 −0.60 0.0140 0.16 0.0640 0.53
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal stock returns
Days (-2,+2) 0.6120 2.50‡ 1.3713 4.31† 0.7593 1.89∗
Days (-1,+1) 0.6097 2.76† 1.2955 4.50† 0.6858 1.89∗
Days (0,+1) 0.2633 1.21 1.0740 3.96† 0.8107 2.33‡
Panel C: Analysts’ abnormal forecast revisions
Month 0 0.0655 0.31 0.5312 1.81∗ 0.4657 1.28
Months (0,+1) 0.3829 0.98 0.9474 2.88† 0.5645 1.08
Months (0,+3) 0.0970 0.27 0.7561 2.64† 0.6591 1.43
Notes:
This table shows the abnormal stock returns and analysts’ abnormal revisions when
companies announce unexpected increases in provisions (N=222) or unexpected de-
creases in provisions (N=264). The sixth column reports diﬀerences between the
mean abnormal stock returns or abnormal forecast revisions of the two groups (unex-
pected increases in provisions minus unexpected decreases in provisions). I removed
85 ﬁrm-year observations from the sample of 571 ﬁrm-year observations because of
zero changes in provisions.
†,‡,∗ Signiﬁcant at the two-tailed 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 alpha level, respectively.
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Table 5:
Cumulative abnormal stock returns and abnormal forecast
revisions in post-event period and pre-event period
Decrease Increase Diﬀerence
in provisions in provisions (Inc. - Dec.)
mean t-statistic mean t-statistic mean t-statistic
Panel A: Abnormal stock returns
Days (-12,-3) 0.5317 2.16‡ 0.7622 3.02† 0.2305 0.65
Days (+3,+12) 0.0889 0.35 0.2586 1.09 0.1697 0.48
Panel B: Analysts’ abnormal forecast revisions
Months (-6,-4) −0.1579 −1.04 0.2854 1.50 0.4433 1.82∗
Months (+4,+6) −0.3580 −1.01 −0.6020 −1.27 −0.2440 −0.42
Notes:
This table shows the abnormal stock returns and analysts’ abnormal revisions prior
to and after companies’ announcement unexpected increases in provisions (N=222)
or unexpected decreases in provisions (N=264). The sixth column reports diﬀerences
between the mean abnormal stock returns or abnormal forecast revisions of the two
groups (unexpected increases in provisions minus unexpected decreases in provisions).
I removed 85 ﬁrm-year observations from the sample of 571 ﬁrm-year observations
because of zero changes in provisions.
†,‡,∗ Signiﬁcant at the two-tailed 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 alpha level, respectively.
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Table 6:
Regression analysis abnormal stock returns and abnormal
revisions
Abnormal returns Abnormal revisions
Independent variable SC NSC NSC-SC SC NSC NSC-SC
Intercept 0.0042 0.0017 −0.0025 0.0012 0.0030 0.0018
(3.75)† (0.96) (−1.17) (4.05)† (3.05)† (2.32)‡
∆E 0.0496 0.0379 −0.0116 0.0059 −0.0160 −0.0219
(1.54) (0.64) (−0.17) (1.92)∗ (−0.69) (−1.26)
UP 0.2998 0.9880 0.6880 0.0829 0.3214 0.2385
(2.27)‡ (3.11)† (1.95)∗ (2.07)‡ (2.62)† (2.38)‡
INFOASYM 0.0007 0.0028 0.0022 0.0015 0.0031 0.0017
(0.39) (1.60) (0.88) (3.24)† (2.96)† (1.81)∗
INFOASYM*UP 0.1817 1.1936 1.0119 0.1164 0.3249 0.2085
(0.78) (3.26)† (2.29)‡ (1.84)∗ (2.60)‡ (1.79)∗
N 443 128 − 443 128 −
adj. R2 1.52% 8.36% − 3.71% 6.69% −
F-value 2.703‡ 3.898† 5.262† 3.276‡
Notes:
∆E denotes the annual change in reported earnings before adjustments to provisions scaled
by lagged total assets, UP denotes the unexpected change in provisions scaled by lagged
total assets and INFOASYM denotes the level of the information asymmetry measure.
Column SC (NSC) shows the parameter estimates for structure companies (non-structure
companies). Column NSC-SC shows the diﬀerences between parameter estimates for
non-structure companies and parameter estimates for structure companies. T-statistics are
in parentheses.
T-statistics of diﬀerences between parameters βai of model a and parameters β
b
i of model b
are calculated as follows:
tdiffi =
βai − βbi
[V ar(ab)]0.5[V ar(bai )/V ar(
a) + V ar(bbi)/V ar(
b)]0.5
in which:
V ar(ab) =
(na − ka − 1)V ar(a) + (nb − kb − 1)V ar(b)
na + nb − ka − kb − 2
and V ar(bai ) denotes the estimated variance of parameter estimate b
a
i , V ar(
a) denotes the
mean squared error of model a, na equals the number of observations used to estimate model
a and ka equals the number of estimated parameters of model a.
†,‡,∗ Signiﬁcant at the two-tailed 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 alpha level, respectively.
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Table 7:
Regression analysis abnormal stock returns and abnormal
revisions with governance control variables
Abnormal returns Abnormal revisions
Independent variable SC NSC NSC-SC SC NSC NSC-SC
Intercept 0.0042 0.0024 −0.0018 0.0012 0.0030 0.0018
(3.74)† (1.40) (−0.83) (4.15)† (2.94)† (2.17)‡
∆E 0.0460 0.0651 0.0191 0.0057 −0.0162 −0.0219
(1.42) (1.10) (0.27) (1.85)∗ (−0.69) (−1.26)
UP 0.0104 1.9048 1.8945 −0.0426 0.4959 0.5386
(0.03) (2.37)‡ (2.10)‡ (−0.43) (2.32)‡ (2.79)†
INFOASYM 0.0005 0.0034 0.0028 0.0015 0.0031 0.0016
(0.31) (1.93)∗ (1.14) (3.32)† (2.92)† (1.74)∗
INFOASYM*UP 0.0435 1.4534 1.4099 0.0397 0.4327 0.3929
(0.17) (3.52)† (2.82)† (0.48) (2.83)† (2.67)†
OUTBLOCK*UP −0.0210 −1.8366 −1.8156 0.2961 −0.3551 −0.6512
(−0.03) (−2.14)‡ (−1.56) (1.31) (−1.62) (−2.13)‡
MANBLOCK*UP 1.1016 7.6153 6.5138 0.0979 −1.1871 −1.2850
(0.83) (1.70)∗ (1.34) (0.22) (−0.64) (−0.90)
SUPEXEC*UP 0.1057 −0.1271 −0.2328 0.0240 0.0312 0.0072
(0.97) (−0.43) (−0.71) (0.87) (0.37) (0.11)
N 443 128 − 443 128 −
adj. R2 1.39% 12.64% − 3.51% 6.69% −
F-value 1.887∗ 3.624† 3.296† 2.301‡
Notes:
OUTBLOCK denotes the fraction of common shares outstanding held by the largest block-
holder (not being management), MANBLOCK denotes the fraction of common shares out-
standing held by the CEO if he is the largest blockholder, SUPEX denotes the ratio of the
number of supervisors and the number of executives. Column SC (NSC) shows the param-
eter estimates for structure companies (non-structure companies). Column NSC-SC shows
the diﬀerences between parameter estimates for non-structure companies and parameter
estimates for structure companies. T-statistics are in parentheses.
†,‡,∗ Signiﬁcant at the two-tailed 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 alpha level, respectively.
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Table 8:
Diﬀerences between parameter estimates of structure companies
and non-structure companies (NSC-SC ) of regression analyses
with alternative return and revision intervals
Abnormal returns Abnormal revisions
Independent variable Days (-1,+1) Days (-2,+2) Month 0 Months (0,+3)
Intercept −0.0022 −0.0009 −0.0003 0.0011
(−1.46) (−0.89) (−0.62) (1.62)
∆E −0.0052 −0.0075 0.0101 −0.170
(−0.11) (−0.23) (0.90) (−1.11)
UP 0.4438 0.1829 0.1302 0.0369
(1.80)∗ (1.12) (2.01)‡ (0.42)
INFOASYM 0.0017 0.0006 −0.0003 0.0009
(0.97) (0.52) (−0.50) (1.14)
INFOASYM*UP 0.6635 0.3401 0.1404 −0.0526
(2.16)‡ (1.66) (1.86)∗ (−0.51)
†,‡,∗ Signiﬁcant at the two-tailed 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 alpha level, respectively.
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